Consumption Decisions When People Value Conformity by Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David
SCOTTISH INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER 
SIRE-DP-2015-16 
  
 
Consumption Decisions When People Value Conformity 
 
 
Alistair Ulph  
David Ulph 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS 
 
 
 
 
www.sire.ac.uk 
 
1 
 
 
 
Consumption Decisions When People Value Conformity1 
Alistair Ulph2 
and 
David Ulph3 
Abstract 
In this paper we assume that for some commodities individuals may wish to adjust 
their levels of consumption from their normal Marshallian levels so as to match the 
consumption levels of a group of other individuals, in order to signal that they 
conform to the consumption norms of that group. Unlike Veblen’s concept of 
conspicuous consumption this can mean that some individuals may reduce their 
consumption of the relevant commodities. We model this as a three-stage game in 
which individuals first decide whether or not they wish to adhere to a norm, then 
decide which norm they wish to adhere to, and finally decide their actual 
consumption. We present a number of examples of the resulting equilibria, and then 
discuss the potential policy implications of this model.  
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Introduction 
In this paper we examine the implications for understanding consumer behaviour 
and the design of public policy of assuming that individual consumption behaviour is 
influenced by the consumption decisions of other individuals through the existence of 
consumption norms. We distinguish such consumption norms from the interaction 
between individual consumption decisions through the Veblen effect (Veblen (1924)), 
whereby individuals’ consumption decisions are influenced by those of others in a 
competitive manner as individuals seek to match their consumption to that of an 
aspirational group (and differentiate it from that of a distinction group)4. The Veblen 
effect is an externality which can sustain overconsumption and a market distortion 
that needs to be corrected by a policy such as a tax on goods prone to conspicuous 
consumption.  
We consider a different route by which individuals’ consumption decisions may be 
influenced by those of others, namely through a desire to be seen to belong to a 
group of similar-minded individuals, thereby establishing consumption norms5. We 
refer to this form of consumption behaviour as cooperative. A key difference between 
cooperative and competitive interactions in consumption behaviour is that the 
proclivity to conform to a consumption norm can lead some individuals to reduce 
their consumption of a good relative to what they would have consumed in the 
standard economists’ model where consumers take no account of the consumption 
of others. 
There are a number of potential direct benefits that consumers might derive from 
adhering to a consumption norm (see for example Hargreaves-Heap (2013), 
Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2009)). These include: (a) observing members of a 
norm group consuming a product an individual has not experienced can give implicit 
information about the quality of that product; (b) in a related manner, giving people 
information about what similar people achieve in saving energy, or retirement 
savings can significantly increase levels of savings (Allcott (2011))6; (c) by 
developing trust between members of a norm group, consumption norms  can 
reduce transactions costs7; (d) for a number of consumption activities, such as 
                                                          
4
For recent analyses of the Veblen effect see Arrow and Dasgupta (2010), Dasgupta, Southerton, Ulph and 
Ulph (2014) and Ulph (2014). The Veblen effect is invoked to explain the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin (1974, 
2001) ) whereby, after a certain level  of per capita  income, further growth in income per capita seems to have 
no effect on measures of well-being as captured by surveys of happiness (see for example Oswald (2014)). 
5
 The most influential sociological theories of consumption – especiallǇ Bourdieu’s ;ϭϵϴ4Ϳ accouŶt of taste aŶd 
distiŶctioŶ aŶd BauŵaŶ’s ;ϭϵϵϬͿ accouŶt of Ŷeo-tribal lifestyles – both present social norms and belonging as 
the fundamental mechanisms underpinning its contemporary social patterning (see Southerton (2002) for a 
full discussion). In our use of the term  consumption norms should be interpreted as a subset of the much 
broader category of social norms which can affect behaviour. 
6
 See Bennett et al (2009) for a comprehensive analysis of the clustering of consumption activities based on 
overlapping cultural interests in the UK. 
7
This is linked to notions of social capital. It is important to distinguish between group membership developing 
greater trust between insiders – a positive social benefit – and developing a greater distrust of outsiders – a 
reduction in social benefit (see Putnam (2000) and Dasgupta (2000) for a recognition that social capital may 
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reading a book or attending a concert, the benefits are not just the private 
experience but the subsequent opportunity to share thoughts about such 
experiences (the ‘water cooler’ effect) and this requires individuals to have 
overlapping sets of cultural interests; (e) for activities like provision of public goods, 
voting, or charitable giving evidence suggests that individuals are more willing to 
contribute if they know members of their norm group have contributed or think others 
might match their contributions (referred to as conditional cooperation) – see for 
example Ledyard (1995), Azar (2004), Frey and Meier (2004), Tan and Bolle (2007), 
Gerber and Rogers (2009), Chaudhuri (2011), Bucholz, Falkinger and Rubbelke 
(2012), Abbott, Nandeibam and O’Shea (2013). 
Over and above such direct benefits, however, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have 
argued that an ability to identify with a group of people is a key part of self-identity 
and yields an important psychological benefit of belonging to a group, what Adam 
Smith referred to as the ‘special pleasure of mutual sympathy’8. It is this pure 
psychological benefit of belonging to a group that we have in mind in this paper. An 
important implication is that it is the potential internal loss of such a benefit that 
provides the incentive to adhere to the consumption norm, rather than the design of 
punishment strategies by other players which has been an important focus of some 
of the analysis of social norms (e.g.  Axelrod (1986))9  
Much of the literature on consumption norms does not provide a formal model of how 
consumption norms might influence consumers’ behaviour. The paper that is closest 
to the model reported here is the study by Bernheim (1994) of conformity. In his 
model people differ in terms of their types (measured by a single index distributed 
over some interval). Society has a pre-specified notion of an ideal type and people 
suffer a loss of self-esteem the further their type is from the ideal. Individual’s well-
being depends on the utility they get from their actions, and the esteem in which they 
are held by others. If an individual’s type was public information, all an individual 
could do is to act to maximise utility. But an individual’s type is private information, 
and has to be inferred from one’s actions, so individuals have an incentive to bias 
their actions towards that which an ideal person would perform; this leads some 
individuals to do more than they would do to maximise utility and others to do less. 
There are two possible equilibria: a fully-revealing equilibrium and a pooling 
equilibrium in which a group of individuals whose types are closer to the ideal type 
carry out the same level of action – so the equilibrium specifies a common action 
norm and the group of people who adhere to this common norm.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
have negative as well as positive effects) .  Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2009) construct a measure to test this 
distinction, and in their experiments they find it is the negative effect which predominates.  
8
 Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2009)  also develop a test to measure this psychological benefit of belonging  to 
a group; they find that it balances out the negative effect of group membership noted in the previous 
footnote. 
9
 Aǆelrod’s aŶalǇsis also differs froŵ ours iŶ that he uses aŶ eǀolutioŶarǇ gaŵe approach, ǁhile ǁe assuŵe 
that individuals are conventional utility-maximisers, albeit with non-standard utility functions. 
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In this paper we focus directly on consumption behaviour and consumption norms, 
and we examine how behaviour influenced by such norms relates to traditional 
analysis of consumer demand captured by Marshallian demand curves. Like 
Bernheim we want to explain endogenously how consumption norms change 
individual consumer behaviour, which consumption norms can emerge as 
equilibrium norms, and how many norms there might be. All behaviour is assumed to 
be individual – there is no process for communication or coordination. Unlike 
Bernheim all information is public. In particular, to rule out other channels of 
interactions, we assume consumers are perfectly informed about the quality of the 
commodities being consumed and consumption is a private good. The crucial 
difference is that there is no concept of an ideal type of consumption, and the 
motivation to belong to a group is the pure psychological benefit discussed above. 
In the next section we set out a model of consumption norms10, and in section 3 we 
illustrate the analysis by considering a couple of special cases. In section 4 we 
analyse the public policy implications, and conclude in section 5. The key results are 
that there can be multiple possible equilibria for consumption norms, and that for 
some parameter values conventional economic policy recommendations may be 
ineffective or even counter-productive. 
1. A Model of Consumption Norms 
There are 2 goods: good 1 which is the potential norm good and good 2 which is 
expenditure on all other consumption. For good 1 the unit cost of production is   ; 
we assume that in the absence of any policy the market for good 1 is competitive 
and so market price p will equal unit cost of production,  . For good 2 the unit cost of 
production is 1 and its market price is 1.  
Individuals can choose whether or not to adhere to a norm.  If an individual chooses 
not to adhere to a norm, a typical consumer with income M has utility function: 
( , )u c M pc with corresponding Marshallian demand for good 1: 0( , )c p M which is the 
solution of  
  1 2 0u pu        (1) 
and indirect  utility   
0 0 0( , ) [ ( , ), ( , )]v p M u c p M M pc p M 
  (2) 
If instead the consumer has chosen to adhere to some consumption norm c   then 
the utility of the typical consumer is now: 
                                                          
10
 In Dasgupta, Southerton, Ulph and Ulph (2014) we presented a brief summary of the model presented in the 
next section and illustrated its implication for environmental policy in a simple special case. In this paper we 
set out the model in greater detail and seek to draw more general public policy implications.  
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( , , ; , ) ( , )u c M p c u c M pc c c        
  (3) 
where α measure the individual’s strength of adherence to the norm11, or the utility 
cost per unit of consumption that differs from the norm, and φ measures the strength 
of the desire for conformity  i.e. the pure psychological benefit the individual 
experiences from adhering to a norm, as discussed above. In general individuals 
may differ in their income, M, their strength of adherence to a norm α or their 
strength of desire for conformity, φ.  
We emphasise that any norm c  is not chosen by any individual or group of 
individuals – it has emerged from past custom and practice.   
There is a three-stage game. In stage 1 each consumer decides whether to adhere 
to the prevailing norm or go it alone and choose her Marshallian demand. In stage 2 
we determine which norms could serve as equilibrium norms. Finally in stage 3 the 
consumer chooses what to consume. We work backwards, and in Stages 2 and 3 we 
ignore the fixed benefit  φ  which the consumer derives from adhering to a norm. 
1.1 Stage 3 – Optimal Choice of Consumption 
In this stage the consumer chooses her optimal level of consumption of good 1 given 
her desire to adhere to a norm c . To deal with the absolute value of any difference 
between actual consumption and the norm, we analyse the maximisation of (3) in 
two stages: 
(a) The consumer chooses consumption of good 1 which is at least as great as 
the social norm; i.e. the consumer chooses c to maximise: 
  ( , ) ( ) . .u c M pc c c s t c c       (4) 
To understand the solution to this problem define: 
  ( , , ) arg max ( , )
c
c p M u c M pc c      (5) 
and        ( , ; ) max ( , )
c
v p M u c M pc c       (6) 
as the associated indirect utility function, where c  measures the point at which the 
marginal loss of utility from cutting consumption to adhere to the consumption norm 
c  just equals the marginal loss of utility from not complying with the norm. Note that 
0( , , ) ( , )c p M c p M  . Then the solution to (4) is:  
 ;c c c c c c c c         (7) 
                                                          
11
 Note that if we had expressed the cost of deviating from the norm as 20.5( )c c  then the first-order condition 
for optimal consumption would be   1 2 ( ) 0u pu c c    , so if c c  then 0 ( , )c c p M  so the norm has to be 
Marshallian demand, 
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(b) In a similar way consider the solution of choosing consumption of good 1 
which is no greater than the social norm; i.e. the consumer chooses c to 
maximise: 
 
  ( , ) ( ) . .u c M pc c c s t c c       (8) 
Define: 
  ( , , ) argmax ( , )
c
c p M u c M pc c      (9) 
and    ( , ; ) max ( , )
c
v p M u c M pc c       (10) 
as the associated indirect utility function, where c  measures the point at which the 
marginal loss of utility from increasing consumption to adhere to the consumption 
norm c  just equals the marginal loss of utility from not complying with the norm. Note 
that 0( , , ) ( , )c p M c p M  . Then the solution to (8) is:  
;c c c c c c c c         (11) 
Putting together the solutions of (a) and (b) we have that the optimal choice of 
consumption ˆ( , ; , )c p M c by the individual wishing to adhere to norm c  and 
associated indirect utility ˆ( , ; , )v p M c are: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ; ) ( , ; , ) ( , ; ); ( , ; , ) ( , ; )c c p M c p M c c p M v p M c v p M c                (12a) 
ˆ ˆ( , ; ) ( , ; ) ( , ; , ) ; ( , ; , ) ( , )c p M c c p M c p M c c v p M c u c M pc              (12b) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ; ) ( , ; , ) ( , ; ); ( , ; , ) ( , ; )c c p M c p M c c p M v p M c v p M c                (12c) 
In what follows we define:  
Definition 1:  [ ( , ; ), ( , ; )]c p M c p M  is the norm-consistent interval of consumption 
for an individual with income M and strength of adherence to a norm α. 
Note that the interval contains the Marshallian demand. (12a)-(12c) illustrate the 
gravitational pull of the consumption norm. If the norm lies within the norm-consistent 
interval of consumption the individual consumes at the level given by the norm, 
rather than at the Marshallian demand level, and derives the corresponding level of 
utility, which must be less than the utility derived from consuming at the Marshallian 
level (recall that at this stage we are ignoring the fixed benefit φ from adhering to the 
norm). If the norm lies below (above) the norm-consistent interval the individual gets 
as close as possible to the norm, consuming at the lower (upper) limit of the interval, 
and indirect utility falls linearly at the rate α the further is the consumption norm from 
the lower (upper) limit of the norm-consistent interval of consumption. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
7 
 
Note that, as we stressed in the introduction, the fact that consumers adhere to a 
consumption norm is consistent with consumers consuming more or less than at 
their Marshallian demand levels. There need be no general tendency to over-
consumption.   
Finally, in terms of comparative statics, changes in prices or income shift the 
Marshallian demand, and hence the norm-consistent interval, in standard ways. As 
the norm c  varies, consumption and indirect utility vary as given by (12) and Fig 1. 
As α increases the norm-consistent interval widens, and utility outside the norm-
consistent interval falls.  
1.2 Stage 2 – Equilibrium Norms.  
In this section we analyse what consumption norms might emerge as equilibrium 
norms for any given distribution of consumer types, i.e. any given distribution of M 
and α amongst consumers who have decided at Stage 1 to adhere to a consumption 
norm. We stress again that consumption norms are exogenous – they have emerged 
from past custom and practice. The issue we explore in this section is which of such 
norms might be equilibrium norms.  Consistent with the analysis in Stage 3 we do 
not require that everyone who adheres to some equilibrium norm must consume 
exactly that level of consumption – the norm could lie outside the norm- consistent 
intervals of some consumers.  
We now define: 
Definition 2: A norm, ec , is an equilibrium norm if it satisfies two properties: 
2 (i) It is the average of the consumption decisions of all the individuals who adhere 
to that norm, as determined in Stage 3. 
2 (ii) If there is more than one norm in existence then the norm to which any 
individual adheres is that which generates the highest level of indirect utility for that 
individual as given by (12). 
To understand the implications of this definition of an equilibrium norm we illustrate 
with the following results for a number of special cases (formal proofs of results 
which are not provided in the text are contained in the appendix).  
Case 1: Identical Individuals 
Result 1 Suppose all the individuals who have chosen to adhere to a norm are 
identical, then, almost surely, there is a single equilibrium norm which can take any 
value in the norm-consistent interval of consumption of a typical individual.  
The intuition is that if the individuals adhered to a norm which lay outside the norm-
consistent interval which is common to all individuals then they would consume at 
the boundary of the norm-consistent interval, so average consumption would not 
equal the norm. So any norm must lie within the norm-consistent interval, and if there 
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was more than one such norm they would choose to consume at the norm which 
yields highest utility12.  
Case 2:  Same Income, Different Strengths of Adherence to a Norm 
Now suppose all individuals who have chosen to adhere to a norm have the same 
level of income but differ in their strength of adherence to a norm; let the lowest 
value of the strength of adherence to a norm amongst these individuals be αL.  
Result 2  Suppose all the individuals who have chosen to adhere to a norm have the 
same income, but differ in the strength of their attachment to a norm, with αL the 
lowest value of the strength of attachment. Then, almost surely, there is a single 
equilibrium norm which can take any value in the norm-consistent interval of 
individuals with strength of attachment to a norm αL. 
The intuition is that if there is a norm which lies strictly outside the norm-consistent 
interval of individuals with strength of adherence αL to which a number of individuals 
adhere, then individuals with strength of attachment αL for sure will consume on the 
boundary of their norm-consistent interval, which will be different from the norm to 
which others adhere, so average consumption will not equal the norm. So any norm 
must lie in the norm-consistent interval of individuals with strength of adherence αL, 
and hence in the norm-consistent interval of all other individuals. If there is more 
than one such norm, all individuals will choose the one which gives the highest level 
of utility, common to all individuals13.    
Case 3:  Different Income, Same Strength of Adherence to Norm 
We consider the simplest case (we consider a richer case in Section 3) where a 
proportion θ of the individuals adhering to a norm have low income, ML and a 
proportion 1- θ have high income MH, MH > ML > 0 but they all have the same 
strength of adherence to a norm α. There are two possibilities – there is a single 
norm to which all adhere or there are two norms.  
Case 3.1 Single Norm. 
There are two sub-cases depending on whether the two groups do or do not have 
overlapping norm-consistent intervals. 
Overlapping Norm-Consistent Intervals 
Result 3 If ( , ; ) ( , ; )L Hc p M c p M  and ec  is an equilibrium norm to which everyone 
adheres, then [ ( , ; ), ( , ; )]e H Lc c p M c p M  . 
                                                          
12
 With negligible probability there could be more than one norm which yield the same level of utility, but we 
exclude such a possibility. 
13
 With the same caveat as in footnote 8. 
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The intuition is that if this not true and, say, the norm c  lay below the lower bound of 
high income consumers’ norm-consistent interval, then low income consumers would 
consume c  and high income consumers would consume ( , ; )Hc p M  so the norm 
would not be the average of their consumption levels.  
Non-overlapping Norm-Consistent Intervals 
Result 4 If ( , ; ) ( , ; )L Hc p M c p M  and ec  is an equilibrium norm to which everyone 
adheres, then ( , ; ) (1 ) ( , ; )]e L Hc c p M c p M      , with low income consumers 
consuming ( , ; )Lc p M  and high income consumers consuming ( , ; )Hc p M  . 
The intuition is that there can be no norm which all consumers actually consume, but 
both low and high income consumers get as close as possible to a common level of 
consumption by consuming at the upper and lower boundaries of their norm-
consistent intervals respectively, with the unique norm being the weighted average of 
these consumption levels.  
Case 3.2  Two Norms 
Suppose low income consumers adhere to an equilibrium norm eLc and high income 
consumers adhere to an equilibrium norm eHc . Then we have: 
Result 5 The norm for each type of consumer must lie in that type’s norm-consistent 
interval and satisfy the conditions ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )e eL L L Hv p M c v p M c  and 
ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )e eH H H Lv p M c v p M c  , for which a necessary, but not sufficient, condition is 
e e
L Hc c . 
That each consumer’s equilibrium norm must lie in its norm-consistent interval 
follows from Result 1. The additional conditions are just a restatement of Definition 2 
of an equilibrium norm to prevent each consumer type adhering to the other’s norm. 
If the two norm intervals are not overlapping then the norm for the low income group 
must lie below the norm for the high income group. If the norm intervals do overlap 
then if e eL Hc c did not hold each consumer’s norm would be further from the 
Marshallian demand than the norm of the other type, and so they would want to 
switch. But e eL Hc c is not sufficient to guarantee that the inequalities in indirect utility 
are satisfied; to see why, suppose there was considerable overlap in the norm-
consistent intervals such that 0( , )e eL H Lc c c p M  ; then low income consumers would 
switch to the norm for high income consumers.  
This completes the examples we have used to illustrate the implications of our 
definition of equilibrium norms we apply in Stage 2. We will give further examples in 
section 3. We now turn to Stage 1. 
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1.3 Stage 1:  Decision on Whether or Not to Adhere to a Norm. 
An individual with income M and strength of adherence to a norm α who adheres to 
an equilibrium norm ec  rather than her Marshallian demand 0( , )c p M suffers a flow 
loss of utility denoted 
 
0 ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ) ( , ; , )e eL p M c v p M v p M c  
  (13) 
Note that this loss has two potential components (i) adopting an equilibrium norm 
which is different from the Marshallian level of demand; (ii) choosing a level of 
consumption different from the norm (when the norm lies outside the individual’s 
norm-consistent interval of consumption). On the other hand the individual gains the 
(constant) utility benefit, φ, from her strength of desire for conformity. The individual 
will conform to the equilibrium norm ec  iff ( , ; , )eL p M c  ; otherwise the individual 
will consume her Marshallian demand.  
To illustrate how the strength of adherence to a norm, α, and the strength of desire 
for conformity, φ, affect a consumer’s choices we define: 
Definition 3: For an individual with income M, strength of adherence to a norm, α, 
and strength of desire for conformity, φ, we define 
 
0 0( , , , ) ( , ) : ( , ; , ) ( , )c p M c p M v p M c v p M        (14a) 
 
0 0( , , , ) ( , ) : ( , ; , ) ( , )c p M c p M v p M c v p M     
  (14b) 
and  [ ( , , , ), ( , , , )]c p M c p M      as the participation-consistent interval of norms.  
It is clear that the participation-consistent interval of norms is wider the higher is the 
value of φ. It follows that [ ( , , , ), ( , , , )] [ ( , , ), ( , , )]c p M c p M c p M c p M       if φ is 
sufficiently small, while the reverse is true if φ is sufficiently large. Finally, because 
( , ; , )v p M c  is decreasing in α for any norm c , it follows from (14a,b) that, while 
greater values of α  widen the norm-consistent interval of consumption, they narrow 
the  participation-consistent interval of norms.  
We now bring together the concepts of equilibrium norms and participation-
consistent norms, which we refer to as the set of full equilibrium norms :  
Definition 4:  For an individual with income M, strength of adherence to a norm, α, 
and strength of desire for conformity, φ, the set of full equilibrium norms is:  
 ( , ; , ) [ ( , ; ), ( , ; )] [ ( , ; , ), ( , ; , )]I p M c p M c p M c p M c p M             (15) 
Thus the set of full equilibrium norms for an individual is the set of consumption 
norms that lie in both the individual’s norm-consistent interval of consumption and 
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the individual’s participation-consistent interval of consumption. Note that the 
Marshallian demand 0( , )c p M lies in both intervals so it must lie in the intersection, 
and so the set of full equilibrium norms, ( , ; , )I p M   ,must be non-empty. 
To assess what might be full equilibrium norms we consider again the three cases 
we introduced in Stage 2.  
Case 1: Identical Individuals. 
Result 6 If individuals are identical, then, almost surely, there will be a single full 
equilibrium norm lying in the interval ( , ; , )I p M   . 
The argument is the same as for Result 1.  
Case 2:  Individuals Differ Solely in Strength of Adherence to a Norm 
We suppose that αL (αH)  is the lowest (highest) value of α in the population. Define:  
( , ; , , ) ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )
[ ( , ; ), ( , ; )] [ ( , ; , ), ( , ; , )]
L H L H
L L H H
I p M I p M I p M
c p M c p M c p M c p M
                 (16) 
as the intersection between the sets of full equilibria for the two types of individual. 
This intersection will also be the intersection between the norm-consistent interval for 
individuals with the lowest strength of adherence to a norm and the participation –
consistent interval for individuals with the highest strength of adherence to a norm; 
the reason is that this is the intersection between the narrowest norm-consistent 
interval (that of individuals with lowest strength of adherence to a norm) and the 
narrowest participation- consistent interval (that of individuals with the highest 
strength of adherence to a norm). 
Then we have: 
Result 7    If individuals differ solely in their strength of adherence to a norm, then, 
almost surely, there is a single equilibrium norm which can take any value in the 
participation-consistent interval of equilibrium norms to which all individuals adhere, 
i.e. ( , ; , , )L HI p M     
We know from Result 2 that there is a single norm which must lie in the norm-
consistent interval of people with lowest value of αL,(the narrowest norm-consistent 
interval common to all members of the population). From the discussion following 
(14) it must also lie in the participation-consistent interval of people with the highest 
value of α, αH (the narrowest participation-consistent interval of norms common to all 
members of the population). If there was a norm which lay in the norm-consistent 
interval of people with the lowest value of α, αL, but not in the participation-consistent 
interval of people of people with parameter αH, though within the participation 
consistent interval of people with lower values of α, then that norm must be further 
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from the common Marshallian demand level and hence yield lower utility; so any 
people adhering to that norm would all prefer the norm lying in the narrower 
participation-consistent interval. 
Case 3:  Different Income, Same Strength of Attachment to Norm 
We assume all individuals have the same strength of attachment to a norm, α, but a 
fraction θ have low income ML and a fraction (1-θ) high income MH > ML > 0. For 
simplicity of notation we define: ( , ; ), ( , ; , )L L Lc c p M c p M    etc. 
Case 3.1 Single Norm 
For both income groups to adhere to a single norm a necessary condition is clearly 
that the participation consistent intervals of the two groups intersect: i.e.  
  H Lc c      (16) 
which we assume will hold throughout this sub-section. From the discussion 
following Definition 3 and condition (14), (16) will hold the narrower is the distribution 
of income, the greater is the value of φ and the smaller is the value of α. So 
individuals cannot differ too much in income relative to the desire for conformity.  
Case 3.1.1 Single Norm, Overlapping Norm-Consistent Intervals of Consumption  
We know from Result 3 that to have overlapping norm-consistent intervals we need: 
  H Lc c    (17) 
But for a full equilibrium we need condition (16) to also hold. So we have: 
Result 8. If H H L Lc c c c   then any norm in [ , ]H Lc c can be a full equilibrium norm to 
which all individuals adhere; if H H L Lc c c c    then any norm in[ , ]H Lc c can be a full 
equilibrium to which all individuals adhere. 
So we need the two conditions for overlapping intervals (16) and (17) to hold 
simultaneously for there to be an equilibrium norm. 
Case 3.1.2 Single Norm, Non-Overlapping Norm-Consistent Intervals of 
Consumption. 
We now suppose that H Lc c . We know from Result 4 that the only potential 
candidate for an equilibrium norm is  (1 )e L Hc c c    . But we now need this to 
also lie in the overlap of participation-consistent intervals as given by (16). So we 
have: 
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Result 9.  If H L H Lc c c c   then the unique full equilibrium norm to which everyone 
adheres is (1 )e L Hc c c    ; if L H L Hc c c c    then the unique full equilibrium 
norm to which everyone adheres is (1 )e L Hc c c    provided this lies in [ , ]H Lc c ; 
otherwise there is no single full equilibrium norm. 
So a necessary condition for ec to be a full equilibrium norm is that  
 [ ( , ; , ), ( , ; , )] [ ( , ; ), ( , , )]H L L Hc p M c p M c p M c p M                (18) 
However condition (18) is not sufficient because there could be values of θ for which 
[ ( , ; , ), ( , ; , )]e H Lc c p M c p M     
Case 3.2 Two Norms 
Suppose low income consumers adhere to an equilibrium norm eLc and high income 
consumers adhere to an equilibrium norm eHc . Then we need these norms to lie in 
the participation-consistent interval of equilibrium norms for each type of consumer, 
i.e. we need  
ˆ ( , ; , ) ,k kc I p M k L H      (19) 
But we also need to ensure that neither type of consumer has an incentive to choose 
the norm of the other type.  So we have:  
Result 10 The norm for each type of consumer must satisfy (19) and the conditions 
ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )e eL L L Hv p M c v p M c   and ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )e eH H H Lv p M c v p M c  , for which a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition is e eL Hc c . 
This completes what we have been able to derive for the general model set out at 
the start of section 2. To illustrate the implications of this model for a rather broader 
set of cases, in the next section we introduce a special case of the general model, 
and then in Section 4 we consider some policy implications from this analysis. 
2. A Special Model 
We now assume that the utility function for a typical consumer takes the form: 
  
2( , , ; , ) 0.5u c M pc c Ac M pc c c         
   (20) 
In what follows, we assume that M is sufficiently large that consumption of good 2 is 
always positive, so M plays no role and w.l.o.g. we assume it is the same for all 
individuals and ignore it in future analysis. We assume that individuals differ only 
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with respect to parameter A. Then it is straightforward to see that Marshallian 
demand and associated indirect utility for a typical consumer are given by  
 
0 0 0 2; ( ) 0.5( )Mc A p v c c        (21) 
We quickly summarise the implications of this special case for consumption 
decisions with norms. 
Stage 3.  Optimal Consumption Choice 
It’s straightforward to see that this typical consumer’s norm-consistent interval of 
consumption is 0 0[ ( ), ( )]c c c c  where: 
  
0 0
0 0
( )
( )
c c c
c c c
     (22) 
and the optimal consumption choice and associated indirect utility of the individual is 
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 2
( , ) ; ( , ) 0.5( )
( , ) ; ( , ) 0.5( )
( , ) ; ( , ) 0.5( )
c c c c c c c v c c c c c
c c c c c c v c c c c
c c c c c c v c c c c
       
                                      (23) 
Stage 2 Equilibrium Norms 
The conditions for a norm to be an equilibrium are as in Definition 2. We illustrate the 
implications in the examples below. 
Stage 1 Decision Whether to Adhere to a Norm 
Let 0 ec c   be the absolute distance between an individual’s Marshallian demand 
and an equilibrium norm ec  and 0 0( ) ( ) ( , )M eL v c v c c   be the loss of utility from 
adhering to that equilibrium norm rather than consuming at the Marshallian level. 
Then from (23) 
 
2( ) 0.5 , 0L          (24a) 
 
2( ) 0.5 ,L            (24b) 
If   is the fixed utility benefit the consumer gets from adhering to a norm; then it 
follows that: 
Result 11 
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11.1 If 20.5   then the individual will adhere to an equilibrium norm ec  iff 
2      , in which case the norm must lie in the norm-consistent interval 
of consumption of the individual; 
11.2 If 20.5  then an individual will adhere to an equilibrium norm ec  iff 
2( 0.5 ) /       , where     .  
So if the benefits of adhering to a norm are large enough, in the sense defined by 
Result 11, then the individual may be willing to adhere to a norm even if it lies 
outside her norm-consistent interval of consumption. 
3.1 Example 1: Two Types of Consumer 
To illustrate the implications we begin with the simple case where there are two 
types of consumers: a fraction θ have low demand for the norm good given by the 
parameter  AL > 0 and a fraction (1-θ) have high demand given by the parameter AH 
where ˆ ˆ, 0H LA A A A   .  
Example 1: Stage 3 – Consumption Norm Intervals 
In Stage 3 we denote Marshallian demands and norm-consistent intervals by 
0 0 0 0 0 ˆ
, , , ;i i i i i i H Lc A p c c c c i H L c c A
           .  
Example 1: Stage 2 -  Equilibrium Norms 
In Stage 2, the choice of equilibrium norms, there are two cases 
Case I: Single Norm: 
The equilibrium norm is denoted ec :  There are two sub-cases.  
 I(i): ˆ0.5 (1 )eL H L HA c c c c c                (25a) 
I(ii): ˆ0.5 [ , ]eL H H LA c c c c c                                               (25b) 
Note that in Case I(ii) there are two possibilities: if ˆ ˆ0.5A A  then the interval 
group; if Aˆ  then the interval [ , ]H Lc c  will contain the Marshallian demands of both 
groups. 
Case II:  Two Norms: 
 Denote the two norms by ,e eL Hc c .  By Result 1, these norms must lie in the relevant 
norm consistent intervals of consumption of each group. We also require 
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , )e e e eL L H L H H L Hv c c v c c v c c v c c  , so each consumer type prefers its own norm. 
It is straightforward to see that these conditions require: 
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0 00.5( )e eH L H Lc c c c     (26) 
so the (unweighted) average of the two norms must lie between the Marshallian 
demands of the two groups.  
Example 1: Stage 1 - Decision to Abide by a Norm 
Finally in Stage 1, the outcomes are as described in Result 11. Note that if 20.5 
then both types of individual will adhere to a single norm only if  max( , )L H      ; 
while if ˆ0.5A  then from (25a) the unique equilibrium single norm c* is such that 
min( , )L H    . So if 2 2ˆ0.5 /8A   then there cannot exist an equilibrium single 
norm. So if the benefits from belonging to a norm are relatively small, and the 
difference in demand between the two groups is sufficiently large that the possible 
single norm lies outside the norm consistent intervals, then there is no equilibrium 
single norm. 
 3.2 Example 2: Three Types of Consumer 
We now suppose that there are three groups of consumers: a fraction L with low 
demand AL, a fraction θM with medium demand AM, and a fraction θH with high 
demand AH where θL+θM +θH = 1. We denote ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , 0, 0M L H MA A A A A A A A      .  
Example 2:  Stage 3 – Consumption Norm Intervals 
We define the consumption norm intervals for the three groups of individuals by 
0 0 0
, , , , ,i i i i i ic A p c c c c i L M H        , which we assume are all strictly positive. 
In what follows it will be useful to introduce the notation: 
(a) /( ); [ (1 ) ];LM L L M LM LM L LM Mc c c           
(b) /( ); [ (1 ) ];MH M M H MH MH M MH Hc c c           
(c)  /( ); [ (1 ) ];LH L L H LH LH L LH Hc c c           
(d) ;LMH L L M M H Hc c c c      LMH L L M M H Hc c c c     .  
Clearly LMH LMHc c .  
Example 2: Stage 2 -  Equilibrium Norms 
In this sub-section we analyse what norms may be stable, and there are now three 
cases: a single norm to which all groups adhere, two norms with two groups 
adhering to one norm and the other group to the other norm, and three norms with 
each group adhering to its own norm. 
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Case I: Single Norm 
Result 12 If consumers belong to three types which differ only in their levels of 
demand and adhere to a single norm, then the possible equilibrium norms are as 
follows:   
(i) L M H L M Hc c c c c c      
0 0ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0.5( )L Lc A A c A A           . 
Any . .e eH Lc s t c c c   is a possible equilibrium norm. 
(ii) L M L H M Hc c c c c c      
0 0 0 0ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆmax[0.5 ,0.5 ] 0.5( ).
L L L Lc A c c A A c A
A A A A
                   
The unique equilibrium norm is: e LHc c  
 
(iii)  L M L M H Hc c c c c c      
0 0 0 0 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ0.5 0.5
L L L Lc A c c A c A A
A A
                  
If  
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ0.5 0.5 [1 ( )( )] 0.5ˆ1 ˆ
LH
LH
AA A A
A
      which requires ˆ(1 )ˆˆLH AA   then the 
equilibrium norm is   e LMHc c ; otherwise the equilibrium norm is e LHc c   
 
(iv)   L L M H M Hc c c c c c      
0 0 0 0ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ0.5 0.5
L L L Lc c A c A A c A
A A
                  
If 
ˆˆ1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ0.5 0.5 [1 ( )( )] 0.5ˆLH
LH
AA A A
A
      which requires 1 /LH A A  then the 
equilibrium norm is:  e LMHc c ; otherwise the equilibrium norm is e LHc c . 
  
(v) L L M M H Hc c c c c c      
0 0 0 0 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆmin(0.5 ,0.5 )
L L L Lc c A c A c A A
A A
                 
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If  
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ0.5 0.5 [1 ( )( )] 0.5ˆ1 ˆ
LH
LH
AA A A
A
      and ˆ1 (1 )ˆˆLH AA    then the 
equilibrium norm is   e LMHc c ; if ˆˆ1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ0.5 0.5 [1 ( )( )] 0.5ˆLH
LH
AA A A
A
      and 
ˆˆ ˆ/
LH
A A   then the equilibrium norm is:  e LMHc c ; otherwise the equilibrium 
norm is e LHc c . 
It is interesting to note that, particularly in cases (ii), iii) and iv), if the equilibrium 
norm is LHc , the outcome is significantly driven by the norm intervals of the groups 
with lowest and highest levels of demand. This is perhaps not very surprising if one 
is searching for a single equilibrium norm to which all groups would adhere. 
Case II:Two Norms 
A second possible outcome is where two groups adhere to one norm with the other 
group adhering to a different norm and there are three possible such cases: (A) L 
and M conform to one norm, H to another; (B) M and H conform to one norm and L 
to another; (C) L and H conform to one norm and M to another. We denote by 2 1,e ec c  
the consumption norms adhered to by the 2 groups and 1 group respectively. The 
following Result shows which of these possible norms will be stable.  
Result 13: If consumers belong to three different groups, who adhere to two norms 
then:  
13.1  There are no stable norms of type  (C);  
13.2 The possible stable equilibrium norms are as follows for the same parameter 
configurations as in Result 12: 
(i) L M H L M Hc c c c c c       i.e. ˆˆ ˆ0.5( )A A    
(a) 2 ( , );e M Lc c c 1 ( , );e H Hc c c  2 1e ec c ; 2 1,e ec c need to satisfy the condition in 
Definition 2(ii) for all three income groups, but note that H will not want to 
switch if 2e Hc c  and L will not want to switch if 1e Lc c . 
(b)  2 ( , );e H Mc c c 1 ( , );e L Lc c c  2 1e ec c ; 2 1,e ec c need to satisfy the condition in 
Definition 2(ii) for all three income groups, but note that H will not want to 
switch if 1e Hc c  and L will not want to switch if 2e Lc c .  
(ii) L M L H M Hc c c c c c       i.e. ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆmax[0.5 ,0.5 ] 0.5( )A A A A    
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(a) 2 ( , );e M Lc c c 1 ( , );e H Hc c c  2 1e ec c ; neither L nor H will wish to switch; 2 1,e ec c
need to satisfy the condition in Definition 2(ii) for M;  
(b)  2 ( , );e H Mc c c 1 ( , );e L Lc c c  2 1e ec c ; neither L nor H will wish to switch;  2 1,e ec c
need to satisfy the condition in Definition (ii) for M;  
(iii)         L M L M H Hc c c c c c         i.e.  ˆˆ ˆ0.5 0.5A A   
(a) 2 ( , );e M Lc c c 1 ( , );e H Hc c c  2 1e ec c ; L, M and H will not wish to switch;  
(b) 2 ;e MHc c 1 ( , );e L Lc c c  2 1e ec c ; neither L nor H will wish to switch;  if  1e Mc c , 
M will want to switch to 1ec , so this will not be a stable set of norms; 
(iv)  L L M H M Hc c c c c c       i.e. ˆˆ ˆ0.5 0.5A A   
(a) 2 1 2 1; ( , );e e e eLM H Hc c c c c c c   ; neither L nor H will want to switch; if 
1
e
Mc c  then M will want to switch, so this will not be a stable set of norms; 
   (b) 2 ( , );e H Mc c c 1 ( , );e L Lc c c  2 1e ec c ; L, M, and H will not wish to switch;   
(v)     L L M M H Hc c c c c c       i.e. ˆˆ ˆmin(0.5 ,0.5 )A A   
(a) 2 1 2 1; ( , );e e e eLM H Hc c c c c c c   ; L, M and H will not want to switch; 
(b) 2 ;e MHc c 1 ( , );e L Lc c c  2 1e ec c ; L, M and H will not wish to switch. 
 
There are two points to note about these results. First, case (C), where L and H 
abide by one norm and M by another is never a stable configuration of norms. So if 
there are three groups of individuals and two equilibrium norms, then the groups 
adhering to a common norm must be from groups with adjacent levels of demand. 
As we move from parameter configurations (i) to (v) we are moving from a 
configuration where there is overlap between the norm-consistent intervals of all 
three income levels to a configuration where there is no overlap between any of the 
norm-consistent intervals. In cases (iii) and (iv), where the norm-consistent intervals 
for low and high income groups do not overlap but the norm-consistent interval for 
group M overlaps one of the other intervals, there may be no stable norm. 
Second, whereas in the single norm case the selected norm was to a considerable 
extent driven by the need to get the extreme demand groups to abide by the norm, 
with two possible norms that is no longer the case and it is the medium group who 
influence which norms emerge as stable norms.  
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Case III: Three Norms 
The analysis of this case follows straightforwardly from the analysis in section 3.1 
Case II.  
Example 2:  Stage 1 – Decision to Abide by a Norm 
Finally in Stage 1, the outcomes are as described in Result 11. Note that if 20.5 
then all types of individual will adhere to a single norm only if  
max( , , )L M H       ; while if ˆˆ ˆ0.5( ) 0.5( )H LA A A A     then from Result 12, the 
unique equilibrium single norm c* is such that min( , , )L M H     . So if 
2 20.5 ( ) /8H LA A    then there cannot exist an equilibrium single norm. So if the 
benefits from belonging to a norm are relatively small, and the difference in demand 
between the two groups with highest and lowest levels of demand is sufficiently large 
that the possible single norm lies outside at least one group’s norm consistent 
interval, then there is no equilibrium single norm.  
This suggests that for a given level of benefit from adhering to a norm, if an increase 
in the number of demand groups is associated with a widening of the overall range of 
demands, then it will prove less likely that there will be a single equilibrium norm. Of 
course this depends significantly on our assumption that the benefit from adhering to 
for the benefit of adhering to norm to depend on how many other groups adhered to 
that norm, then this would offset that effect and make it more likely that there may be 
single equilibrium norm to which all groups adhere. But as our analysis suggests it is 
the width of the overall spread of demand levels, rather than the number of groups 
into which that is sub-divided that matters. It would be useful to have some empirical 
evidence to indicate what might be an appropriate assumption to make about what 
determines the benefits of adhering to a consumption norm. 
3. Policy Analysis  
The above analysis explains why consumers may choose to adhere to consumption 
norms. We now turn to policy analysis. For simplicity we shall use the special case 
from the previous section with two types of consumers.  
We assume that policies are set prior to Stage 1 of the games set out in Sections 2 
and 3 above. There are two kinds of policy issues we wish to explore. First, what 
does the fact that consumers are not consuming their Marshallian demands but 
abiding by norms imply for policy? Second, if there is some other form of distortion in 
the economy, how does the fact that consumers are abiding by norms affect the 
design of policy to correct that distortion? 
3.1 Policy To Address Norms. 
 The government is concerned to maximise welfare defined by: 
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2
2
( , ) [ 0.5 ]
(1 )[ 0.5 ]
L H L L L L
H H H H
W c c c A c c c c
A c c c c
                    (27) 
Note from (25a) that in Case I (i), the equilibrium norm is a weighted average of the 
upper and lower limits of the consumption norm intervals of the low and high demand 
groups respectively. Since these limits depend on the Marshallian demands of the 
two groups, and because the Marshallian demands are sensitive to price, it is 
possible to shift the norm closer to the level of demand that would arise under 
Marshallian demand, which will raise welfare while preserving the benefits of 
adhering to the norm.  Now we know that low demand consumers are consuming 
more than their Marshallian demand by an amount α while high demand consumers 
are underconsuming by a similar amount. So it is straightforward to show that if the 
government imposes a tax  
ˆ (2 1)        (28) 
this will align aggregate consumption with a norm with the aggregate Marshallian 
demand. If θ > 0.5, so low demand consumers predominate, then the optimal policy 
will be a tax to dampen the effects of their ‘overconsumption’; if θ < 0.5, then high 
demand consumers predominate and the optimal policy is a subsidy to boost 
demand; finally if θ = 0.5 the two effects cancel out and there is nothing the 
government needs to do.  
In Case I(ii), it is clear from (25b) that the norm is not sensitive to modest changes in 
price. In this case the best the government can do to align individual decisions with 
the optimum is to ensure that the Marshallian demand lies in the overlap of the norm-
consistent intervals of norms.  This can be achieved by any tax/subsidy in the 
interval: 
      ˆ (1 )H L H La a a a                     (29)  
In a wide range of circumstances this could be consistent with a zero tax. 
Whether implementing such a tax/subsidy policy will achieve the optimum is 
problematic, for large changes in price (through either a tax or a subsidy) could shift 
the interval[ ( , ), ( , )]H Lc p A c p A   in which the equilibrium norm ec  lies so that ec  no 
longer lies in this interval. In that case ec  would no longer be an equilibrium norm 
and consumers would revert to their Marshallian demands. 
4.2  Implications of Norms for Design of Other Policies. 
As an illustration of the implications of norms for the design of other policies we 
consider the example of environmental policy. So now suppose that welfare is given 
by: 
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2
2
( , ) [ 0.5 ]
(1 )[ 0.5 ] [ (1 ) ]
L H L L L L
H H H H L H
W c c c A c c c c
A c c c c c c
                           (30) 
where δ is the environmental damage cost per unit of consumption of the norm good. 
The standard prescription from environmental economics would be to impose a 
Pigovian tax tˆ  . In Case I(i) the optimal policy will be to impose the Pigovian tax 
in addition to the tax/subsidy derived from (28). So the overall policy will be to 
impose a tax ˆˆ (2 1)t       , which could be negative. 
In Case I(ii) again if δ is relatively small the Pigovian tax will have no effect on 
consumption or pollution, while if it is large it could shift down the interval of 
consumption so that it no longer contains the norm, and consumers revert to their 
Marshallian demands. Of course these Marshallian demands with the Pigovian tax 
will be lower than they would be without the tax. Moreover, if 
0.5( ) ( )H L H LA A A A     low demand consumers will revert to Marshallian 
demands which are for sure lower than the lower bound of the interval 
[ ( , ), ( , )]H Lc p A c p A   and hence lower than the norm. On the other hand high 
demand consumers will revert to their Marshallian demands which are for sure 
higher than the upper bound of the interval [ ( , ), ( , )]H Lc p A c p A   and hence higher 
than the norm14.  Could the latter effect outweigh the first two effects? In Dasgupta, 
Southerton, Ulph and Ulph (2014) we present a simple example which shows that 
indeed this can be the case, so with consumption norms conventional environmental 
economics policy recommendation can have the perverse effect of raising pollution 
and reducing welfare.  
So it is possible that for commodities where consumption norms play a significant 
role standard economic policy recommendations could have no effect or even 
perverse effects, due not to any second-best effects but to the non-conventional form 
of consumer preferences. Of course these non –standard results apply only for some 
parameter values, but these are parameters which are not estimated in conventional 
econometric demand analysis. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented a three-stage model of consumption norms to 
capture the notion that particular commodities individuals may choose to consume 
amounts which differ from their conventional Marshallian demand levels in order to 
signify that they wish to be seen as conforming with norms of a group with whom 
they wish to identify. We have shown that there may be multiple norms to which 
different groups of individuals choose to adhere, but also that there can be ranges of 
                                                          
14
 Of course if α > (AH-AL) then it is still possible that the norm lies between the two Marshallian demands and 
so the effects just described still apply 
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values for consumption of norm goods such that any level of consumption within that 
range could be a consumption norm.  
One important implication of this analysis is that, for commodities subject 
consumption norms, small changes in prices may have no effect on demand while 
larger changes could have very marked, and potentially perverse effects, if they lead 
consumers to move away from a particular norm. This has potentially interesting 
implications for econometric analyses of consumer demand, so for example 
conventional estimates which find a low price elasticity of demand may mis-attribute 
this to underlying features of preferences rather than the existence of norms; this 
raises interesting questions as to how one might test for the presence of such norms.  
Similarly, we have also considered the policy implications of consumption norms and 
shown that for some parameter values conventional policy instruments designed to 
change consumption behaviour and hence raise welfare, such as Pigovian taxes, 
may have no effect or may even lead to outcomes which reduce welfare.  
There are a number of obvious extensions that could be made to this analysis. One 
is to consider what happens as we consider a wider range of socio-economic 
demographic characteristics that affect norms, another what happens if norms affect 
a range of commodities, and finally to develop a richer model of the evolution of 
norms: how new norms emerge and what happens when an existing norm is no 
longer an equilibrium – our assumption that consumers revert to Marshallian demand 
levels may only be a short-term effect at best. 
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Figure 1: Norm-consistent interval of consumption  
 ,u C M pC
 0 ,C p M ; ,C p M   ; ,C p M  C
α 
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Appendix:  Proofs of Results 
Result 1:  
Suppose there is a single norm, ( , ; ).c c p M  Then it follows from (12a) that 
everyone will choose to consume ( , ; )c p m so average consumption will be 
( , ; )c p M c  , so c cannot be a norm. Similarly we can rule out the possibility that 
( , ; ).c c p M   So the norm must lie in the norm-consistent interval. If there are more 
than one norms lying in the norm-consistent interval, then all consumers will choose 
the one that yields highest utility, so apart from the case where two norms give 
identical utility – which happens on a set of parameters of measure zero – only one 
norm will be adhered to.  QED 
Result 2: 
Suppose there are two types of individual who differ in their strength of attachment 
,H L  , and, from Result 1, there is a single norm [ ( , ; ), ( , ; )]H Hc c p M c p M  but 
( , ; )Lc c p M  then those with strength of attachment H will adhere to c while those 
with strength of attachment L will adhere to ( , ; )Lc p M  so average consumption 
exceeds c ,so we can rule out this possibility. Similarly if ( , ; )Lc c p M  . So the 
equilibrium norm must lie in the tightest norm-consistent interval, that for people with 
lowest strength of adherence to a norm. QED 
Result 3: 
Suppose the result is not true and that the norm ( , ; )Hc c p M  . Then the high-
income consumers will consume ( , ; )Hc p M   while the low-income consumers will 
consume max{ , ( , ; )}Lc c p M  . Average consumption will be above c and so c cannot 
be a norm. A similar argument applies if ( , ; )Lc c p M  . QED  
Result 4: 
Using the sort of proof employed in Result 3, it is clear that there cannot be a norm 
with ( , ; )Lc c p M  , because, if there were, high income consumers would consume 
( , ; ) ( , ; )H Lc p M c p M c   while low income consumers will consume 
max{ , ( , ; )}Lc c p M  . Similarly there cannot be a norm ( , ; )Hc c p M  . So any 
candidate norm must satisfy ( , ; ) ( , ; )L Hc p M c c p M   in which case from (12) the 
consumption levels of the low and high income groups are ( , ; ), ( , ; )L Hc p M c p M   
respectively. So the only norm which equals the average consumption levels of all 
individuals conditional on that norm is ( , ; ) (1 ) ( , ; )e L Hc c p M c p M      . 
Result 12:  
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1. Suppose the norm c* is such that * Hc c . Then the H group will consume 
Hc while L and M groups will consume c* and it must be the case that 
* * * *L M H H Hc c c c c c       , which is a contradiction; so * Hc c . 
Similarly if *Lc c there would be a contradiction. So the only possible 
equilibrium is a norm c* such that *H Lc c c  . 
2. Suppose the norm *c is such that *M Lc c c  ; then the H group will 
consume Hc ,the L group will consume Lc  and M will consume *c ; so it 
must be the case that * * *L L M H H LH Lc c c c c c c        , which is a 
contradiction. Similarly if *H Mc c c  there would be a contradiction. So the 
only possible outcome is a norm *c such that *L Hc c c  , the H group will 
consume Hc , the L group will consume Lc  and M will consume c*; so it 
must be the case that * * *L L M H H LHc c c c c c       . 
3. (i) As in 2, the norm cannot lie strictly below Lc  nor above Hc . Suppose 
that L LH Mc c c  , but the norm * LHc c ; then group M will consume *c , 
group L will consume Lc  and group H will consume Hc ;  so it must be the 
case that * LHc c . Finally, suppose that LH Mc c , which requires that 
0.5 0.5 [1 ( )( )] 0.5
1
LH
LH
AA A A
A
      and (1 )LH AA    . Suppose there is 
a norm *c such that *M Hc c c  ; then group  L will consume Lc , group M 
will consume Mc and group H will consume Hc , so *LMHC C .  
(ii)  The proof is analogous to that for 3(i) 
4. The proof follows from 3(i) and (ii).                                                 QED 
Result 13:   
13.1 w.l.o.g we assume 0Lc   so: 
0 0 0; 2 ; ; ; 2 ; ; ; 2L L M M M H H Hc c c A c A c A c A A c A A c A A                   
We denote * *1 2;c A c A A      where w.l.o.g we assume 
0 ;0 2 A           
The conditions for * *2 1,c c to be stable are: 
* 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0
1 2 2 1 1 2; ;L L M M H Hc c c c c c c c c c c c           i.e. 
   ( ) ; ;C i A A A C ii A C iii A                              
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There are five possible sets of parameter values: 
(a) ; 0A        
From C(i) and C(ii):  0A            , a contradiction 
(b) ; 0A A       
From C(i) and C(ii): 2 0A A A A               , a contradiction 
(c) ; 0; 0A A             
As in (a), from C(i) and C(ii) 0A            , a contradiction 
(d) ; 0; 0A A             
As in (b) from C(i) and C(ii) 2 0A A A A               , a 
contradiction 
(e) ; 0;A        
From C(ii) and C(ii) A           , a contradiction.   
13. 2. 
The proof is a straightforward application of earlier results. Q.E.D. 
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